

Mongolian Migration and the Ming's Place in Eurasia

David M. Robinson*

The large-scale movements of individuals and communities—that is, migration—under the Mongol Empire during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries shaped the ways in which the early rulers of the Ming dynasty of China (1368–1644) sought to establish their place in eastern Eurasia. The Mongol Empire had reshaped old borders and boundaries (political, ethnic, and otherwise) throughout Eurasia. Large numbers of people affiliated with the *Yeke Mongghol ulus*, the Great Yuan Nation, settled in regions both within and adjacent to what would become the borders of the Ming dynasty. The Great Yuan *ulus* had so tightly integrated the steppe and sown that it is impossible to understand the place of the early Ming court without considering the broader context of eastern Eurasia.

The decision to incorporate several hundred thousand Mongols and Jurchens into the Ming state formed one piece of a larger effort to establish a place for the Ming dynasty in Eurasia by engagement with the legacy of the Mongols.¹ At the same time as he stressed his commitment to purge the polity of cultural and ritual corruption introduced by Mongol rule, the founder of the Ming dynasty, emperor Hongwu (r. 1368–98), conscientiously conducted sacrifices for the celebrated Mongol ruler of the Yuan dynasty, Qubilai (1215–94), and accorded generous treatment to captured members of the Chinggisid

*Colgate University (Hamilton, NY, U.S.A.)

family.² Hongwu's son, emperor Yongle (r. 1403–24), made prominent use of Mongol personnel at the same time as he led imperial troops into the steppe against Mongolian nobles there.³ Such a multifaceted engagement grew out of the blurring of population and political borders that occurred under the Mongols and was fed by the continuing rivalry between the Ming court in China and the Mongol court on the steppe. Early Ming rulers and their advisors were keenly aware that ignoring the Mongol court on the steppe or the wider legacy of the Mongolian empire was simply impossible.

Rather than attempt a comprehensive study, this essay offers a few observations regarding Mongol migration to Ming territory during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Particular attention is given to (a) the Ming court's narrative or rhetorical strategies in describing Mongolian migration, and (b) a fuller recognition of the Mongols' agency in their decision to relocate to Ming territory. At the outset, I should note that my use of "Mongols" and "Mongolian" is broad and generally privileges political affiliation rather than "ethnic" identity. Although the early Ming court sometimes drew upon language that essentialized differences ostensibly rooted in the "original nature" of a given people, more often it was concerned with political allegiance, an issue of critical importance in its ongoing rivalry with the Yuan court.

I. MIGRATION DURING THE MONGOL EMPIRE

Scholars have shown that the creation and maintenance of the Mongol Empire resulted in the relocation of large numbers of people across the length and breadth of Eurasia.⁴ In the early years, migrants were often war refugees fleeing the Mongol onslaught.⁵ In some cases, defeated ruling houses fled with relatively small bands of fellow nobles and warriors.⁶ As Michal Biran's valuable work has detailed, political dislocation caused by the Mongol campaigns of unification on the steppe set in motion the movement of men like the Naiman Gūchūlūg, who, fleeing Chinggis Khan, escaped to the territory of the Qara Khitai. There he seized power from the Gürkhan, dallied with the Khwarazm Shah, and eventually "annihilated" the Qara Khitai dynasty.⁷ Other scholars have focused on the mobilization of subject people from one part of the empire to serve in other areas. Peter Golden and Charles Halperin have explored the impact of the Mongol conquests and the demands of empire on Turkic populations throughout Eurasia, with a particular focus on Central and Western Asia.⁸ For eastern Eurasia, we have fine studies on

the movement of Turks, Muslims, Tibetans, and Europeans into China.⁹ Thomas Allsen's fascinating research on the relocation of artisans, technicians, soldiers, priests, and others, often as entire communities throughout the Mongolian empire, has illuminated another facet of migration and its broad influence during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.¹⁰ These valuable studies have in general focused on the defeated and the subjugated rather than the Mongols themselves.

The Mongolian diaspora, however, deserves closer attention. The distribution of Mongolian communities in the late fourteenth century was markedly different than it had been on the eve of empire late in the twelfth century. Maps of the Mongol Empire with big bright arrows indicating the advance of Mongol armies throughout Eurasia are included in most standard texts. We would not be too far wrong to think of them as maps not only of military campaigns but also of the Mongolian diaspora, which resulted in the spread of Mongols from east to west—Manchuria, eastern, central, and western Mongolia, Central Asia, and West Asia—and north to south—the steppe down to subtropical regions like Yunnan, and to northern India. Thomas Allsen has offered a telling example: around 1250, a unit of Oirats was formed, which went to Iran with Hulegu, and revolted forty years later and defected to the Mamluks, who stationed them in modern-day Israel. This means that some Oirats who were born on the western shores of Lake Baikal died on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean.¹¹

Although scholars have rightfully stressed the importance of the Chinggisid state in coerced migrations (such as Allsen's example above), it is important to keep in mind the agency or autonomy of individual groups or people. I will return to this point below, but for now it is useful to bear in mind the well-known bromide that the Mongol Empire connected east and west for the first time (remembering of course that the empire was not a neutral or passive conduit through which sedentary civilizations interacted).¹² Building on this basic idea, S. A. M. Adshad argued that the Mongol Empire made possible what he termed the "basic information circuit." He used the notion to describe "the emergence of a unified conceptualization of the world, with the geographies, histories and cultures of the parts coordinated with each other."¹³ Adshad was speaking primarily about the establishment of sustained and direct links among East Asia, "Islamdom," and Western Europe that developed as a result of the Mongol Empire. If Adshad and many other scholars have concentrated on the east–west ties (he does not in fact discuss the steppe's knowledge of other regions), it is important not to forget the north–south connections, in particular the greatly increased flow

of information about China into the steppe.¹⁴

By the mid-fourteenth century, Mongolian elites—and, one suspects, less exalted members of the Chinggisid polity—were vastly better informed about the government, economy, society, and material culture of China than they had been on the eve of empire. They commanded a more accurate and complete knowledge of China, especially its central and southern regions, than had any previous steppe polity in history. This would have important consequences for the Mongolian diaspora following the empire's collapse, as I hope to show below.

II. AFTER THE FALL

When the great *uluses* of the empire collapsed in the fourteenth century (and later in the case of the Golden Horde), Mongolian communities did not suddenly withdraw to the steppe. They became enduring features of the social, political, military, and cultural landscape of many of those same regions. Such a situation was most obvious in places like Central Asia, northern China, western Manchuria, southwestern China, and the lands around the Golden Horde. Although members of the Chinggisid nobility often retained considerable prestige, Chinggisid and other Mongol groups did not always emerge as the supreme rulers of those regions. They did, however, retain great significance within the military and political landscape of Eurasia. In her analysis of Temür's rise in the mid-fourteenth century, Beatrice Manz has observed that "a major source of non-tribal power was the regional armies of Transoxiana," which probably had their origins in military units of the house of Chaghatay. One of these groups, the Qara'unas, figured prominently in Temür's efforts to fashion a coherent polity during the second half of the fourteenth century.¹⁵ During the career of Babur, a descendent of Temür and "founder" of the Moghul dynasty, Mongolian nobles (including his maternal uncle among others) repeatedly appear as welcome (if somewhat fickle) allies. In an effort to strengthen these ties, on his deathbed in 1530, Babur married two of his daughters to Chaghatay Mongols.¹⁶ As Peter Golden has noted, "Turkicizing Mongols (of Jalayir, Qongqirad, Mangid, Merkid, Kereyid, Agrun, and Naiman origins)" formed one element in the emergence of the Crimean Tatars, Qipchak Özbeks, the Qazaqa, the Nogays, Qara Qalpaqs, Baskirs, and others.¹⁷ Despite the differences between these regimes and the Ming dynasty, Ming efforts to exploit Mongol groups should be understood as part of a wider pan-Eurasian trend observable among the successor states

to the Chinggisid empire to exploit the military, linguistic, and other skills of Mongolian populations. At the same time, the widely spread Mongolian communities adapted to the changing circumstances of Eurasia.

III. IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE: THE MING COURT

Finally, let me now turn to my main subject, the newly founded Ming dynasty, established in 1368. At the outset, I would like to make explicit what has been implicit in much of what I have said thus far: the Ming dynasty grew up in the shadow of the Mongol Empire. When Toghan-Temür (1320–70)—better known by a title the Ming court posthumously imposed on him, Shundi—and his court fled Daidu in 1368, neither the relocated populations nor the ties between steppe and sown formed during the time of empire vanished. Mongols continued to migrate into China. As a result, the Ming founder, Hongwu, his son Yongle, and their advisors were deeply engaged with individuals and communities affiliated with the Great Yuan *ulus*.¹⁸ These included the “Northern Yuan” ruling family, Mongol nobles, prominent military commanders, ambitious up-and-comers, and more humble steppe inhabitants. As many have noted, Mongolian political culture generally valued political allegiance over genealogical or racial factors in the construction of identity. At the risk of overstating the matter, anyone who joined the Mongols might be considered in a broad sense a Mongol.¹⁹ The Great Yuan *ulus* comfortably accommodated large numbers of men and women who, depending on the context, might be known primarily as Jurchen, Chinese, Korean, Kipchak, Turkestanian, or some combination thereof.

Throughout history, Chinese rulers have seldom talked exclusively to their Chinese subjects, but the energy the early Ming emperors spent on engaging the Other—through imperial proclamations; dispatching envoys to the steppe, Koryö, and elsewhere; direct personal interaction in the capital or on the trail; and large-scale military campaigns—is striking, especially when it is compared, say, to the posture assumed by the Song emperors. In many ways it more closely resembled the rhetoric of the Tang, whose cosmopolitan complexion and deep engagement with the rest of Eurasia is often contrasted with the Ming, the latter being frequently if incorrectly described as inward-looking, even xenophobic.

The long shadow cast by the Great Yuan *ulus* can be viewed from several perspectives; below I focus on the impact of the Mongolian diaspora on the Ming dynasty in terms of the international environment and the domestic arena.

IV. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

During its early decades, the Ming court faced regimes controlled by the Yuan court, its close supporters, loose allies, and former subjects on nearly every side. To the northeast were Koryō, Liaodong, Jurchen lands, and the eastern Mongolian steppe. To the north was the Chinggisid Yuan court (or the Northern Yuan). In the northwest were Köke-Temür and other nobles tied to the Chinggisid court. In the west were a wide variety of Mongol-affiliated groups, whether we consider them in terms of constellations of individual polities like Hami, larger regions like Uyghuristan or Mogulistan, or major if somewhat diffuse dynasties like the Timurids. A similar situation obtained in the southwest. Tibet had once been a key element of the Great Yuan *ulus*, but by the fourteenth century its ties to the Yuan court had grown much weaker. Far more important in the late fourteenth century as a base of Yuan power was Yunnan, where the Liang Prince, Vajravarmi, maintained a considerable military presence. Although Annam and Japan had both successfully escaped military and political domination by the Mongols, their relations with the early Ming court were far from cordial. Unable to negotiate acceptable diplomatic terms with Japanese leaders, Hongwu essentially called a time out for several decades. Thus, Japan and Annam did not offer obvious sources of support for the beleaguered Ming.

Simply put, the Mongol Empire and its attendant Mongolian diaspora had profoundly reshaped the political landscape of Eurasia. The early Ming court never had a choice but to come to terms with the Yuan court and other Mongolian populations in eastern and central Eurasia. I will discuss the Ming founder's strategies below.

We can begin with the Mongolian populations that during the empire's expansion had settled within the borders of territory controlled or claimed by the Ming dynasty. Despite Hongwu's rhetoric about purification, the eradication of Mongolian "mutton stench" 羶腥, and the revival of an undefined "Chinese" cultural (Hua-Xia 華夏) tradition, he was now emperor at least in name of sizeable Mongolian, Jurchen, Turkic, and Korean populations. The historical demographer Wu Songdi 吳松弟 has suggested that during the period of Mongol rule, as many as two million Mongols, Turkestani, Koreans, Qitan, Jurchens, and other non-Chinese relocated to the Central Plains. Of these, he suggests, approximately 400,000 were Mongols.²⁰ Estimates of how many Mongols remained in China vary, but probably numbered in the hundreds of thousands.²¹ Most communities were

located along the northern border, but many lived in Daidu 大都 (renamed Beiping 北平 during the early decades of the Ming), Jiangnan 江南, and the hinterlands like Henan 河南. Hongwu was fully aware of the political and military significance of these populations that now had to be integrated into Ming administrative systems of control. This was part of the larger enterprise of reestablishing dynastic control over the people and resources of China after decades of disruptive civil war.

One might argue that the Ming state elected not to forcibly relocate or repatriate the hundreds of thousands of Mongolian men, women, and children, because such a policy would have strained the limited resources of the fledgling Ming state. Yet it should be remembered that Hongwu and Yongle in fact did engage in large-scale population relocations. During the first three reigns of the Ming dynasty, approximately one million people were moved to the provinces of northern China.²² Perhaps more important than the organizational capacity of the early Ming state were concerns that expatriating communities of Mongols and other groups that had served the Yuan dynasty would spark disruptive resistance and compromise the rhetoric of universal rulership that the Ming founder and his court favored. Hongwu moved many Chinese families around, but neither revoked their status as Ming subjects nor drove them beyond the borders of Ming territory.

V. MIGRATION CONTINUES

The movement into China of individual Mongols, entire families, and sometimes even larger units did not end in 1368. As Henry Serruys documented in great detail many decades ago, substantial migration from the steppe to Ming territory (and elsewhere) continued throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (and beyond).²³ Although documentary evidence is patchy, it seems safe to assume that much migration occurred beyond state control and thus does not surface in imperial records. Further, if migration patterns elsewhere in the world are any guide, new migrants built on existing networks of relatives, friends, and other acquaintances that had been established during the time of empire. As noted above, migrants initially tended to settle in areas along the northern borderlands, the huge swathe of territory where the Ming state exercised relatively light control. In some cases, the Northern Yuan court and its allies contested control of these lands. Domination famously see-sawed between the Ming and Yuan courts over such places as Dongsheng 東勝 and Daning 大寧 along the evolving northern

border.

In other cases, the Ming state yielded considerable autonomy to local populations—such as the arrangements made at Anle 安樂, Zizai 自在, and Dongning garrison 東寧衛 in Liaodong, the northeastern corner of the empire. Mongols and Jurchens settled in these regions were subject to the administrative supervision of the Ming authorities, but often enjoyed relatively free movement between Ming territory and their homelands. Another part of the northern borderlands' appeal was its physical proximity and environmental similarity to the places from which Mongolians emigrated.

VI. MING APPROPRIATION OF MONGOL MIGRATION

However, the Ming state did not simply throw open the doors to Mongolian immigration. A portion took place under the aegis of the Ming court.

Because the central government recorded the process in some detail, we know far more about this part of the story than about other forms of Mongolian migration into Ming territory. The basic pattern as it appears in such imperial annals as the *Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty* 明實錄 was that a Mongol (or Jurchen) leader would show up at the border and petition the Ming authorities for permission to settle in Ming territory, often expressing a preference for a particular location, most commonly Beijing, Nanjing 南京, or Liaodong 遼東 (usually Kaiyuan 開原 or Liaoyang 遼陽). The court would grant permission, and in some cases order local authorities to provide housing, lands, titles, and stipends to the newly arrived migrants.

Many scholars—and I myself am guilty of this tendency—have viewed Mongolian migration through the lens of the Ming state. We tend to see it as a product of the Ming central government's efforts to recruit Mongols in order to pursue the interests of the state. These interests included (a) frustration of Mongol efforts at reunification, (b) incorporation of valued personnel into the Ming state (as military professionals, diplomats, interpreters, and translators), and (c) winning recognition as a legitimate dynasty on the wider stage of Eurasia in its rivalry with the Yuan court.

This overwhelming stress on the Ming state is understandable, but misleading on several counts. As noted at the outset, Mongolian migrations into China pre-dated the establishment of the Ming state. Initially, they also tended to occur in areas beyond Ming control and for reasons the Ming state tended to downplay. Here it is important to remember the early Ming court's

keen and sustained political, military, and ideological rivalry with the Yuan court on the steppe. In its ongoing rhetorical efforts to gain international recognition and step out of the shadow of the Great Yuan *ulus*, the Ming court appropriated Mongolian migration for its own purposes.

The Ming court attempted to regulate and package Mongolian migration in a form that highlighted its own authority. Official state accounts of migration often fit the Mongols' behavior into a particular format. The petition to reside in Ming territory was portrayed as submission and a promise to work on behalf of the Ming throne.²⁴ The advantages of this rhetorical framework were multiple: the Ming state appeared to exercise firm control over its borders, over its frontier administration, over access to its territory, and over the decision where to settle the migrants. It also appeared to possess control over the immigrants' bodies and services. When one considers the rivalry between the Ming and Yuan courts during the late fourteenth century, it is perhaps not surprising that the imperially compiled chronicle the *Ming Veritable Records* generally preferred the label "former Yuan" officials and commanders to describe Mongols, Turkestani, and Chinese personnel who relocated to Ming territory.²⁵ The key question was political allegiance rather than ethnic identity. Whenever possible, the early Ming court tried to convey the message that the Yuan dynasty had come to a final and irreversible demise.

In these accounts, Mongolian motives for migration are often reduced to two. Proper motivation included (a) acknowledgement that the Mandate of Heaven had shifted and (b) a profound esteem for the throne or Chinese civilization. Imperial chronicles tended to lump any other motivations together as "pursuit of profit," precluding a serious assessment of the Mongolians' reasons for migration. The extant records suggest that negotiations about conditions were often papered over. Disagreements or cases when the Mongol migrants changed their minds and decided to leave or protested their settlement were usually portrayed as betrayal and/or indications of the Mongols' natural inconstancy.²⁶ The Ming throne often adopted a similar rhetorical posture even in relations with Mongol leaders who were not interested in migration. In 1437, the newly enthroned Zhengtong emperor (r. 1436–49) dispatched a military commander to one Mongol noble bearing a proclamation praising him for his decision to "follow the Mandate of Heaven and respect [Our] court, sincerely dedicating your efforts on [Our behalf] and never once flagging." The emperor urged the Mongol leader to "be even more subservient to Heaven's heart and even more true in devotion" to the Ming in the future.²⁷

Even when the throne acknowledged the Mongols' economic need, it linked it to submission to the Ming. In another example from 1437, Zhengtong issued the following command to the Minister of Revenue: "The Tatar officers who have come in submission suffer hardship. All those who have come since the first year of the Xuande reign (1425) are ordered to receive their grain at the capital storehouses in order to encourage their intention to obey and be transformed" 以慰其順化之心.²⁸ Although the Ming court regularly used the rhetoric of transformation, implying a moral or cultural change, perhaps more fundamental was its concern that newly relocated men and women from the north obey dynastic law and put their skills at the disposal of the throne.

VII. MONGOLIAN AGENCY IN MIGRATION

It is easy for historians to conclude that the Ming state drove Mongolian migration. This is not accidental; the Ming state was careful to craft the narrative of Mongolian migration in exactly those terms. Yet we know from scattered accounts that border officials, court ministers, and the throne were aware of the complexity of Mongolian motives for migration. Such discussions explored a wide variety of factors, including rivalries among Mongolian leaders, the desire of Mongolian families and groups for the comparative safety of Ming territories, subtle strategies to mobilize Ming resources against Mongolian rivals, the wish to be united with family members already settled in Ming territory, the opportunity to improve social and economic status through service in the Ming military, and the possibility of securing badly needed food and supplies during periods of drought or epidemic. The list could of course be expanded.

As we consider Mongolian motives for migration, it is useful to bear in mind the observations of Dirk Hoerder. He writes,

Since, first and foremost, voluntary (and coerced) migrants have to be able to establish an economic base at the destination (survival economy), migration systems connect areas having a relative surplus of labor, skills, and capital or lack of resources (such as land) with areas with a relative demand for labor, skills, or resources. It is not, however, "objective" data on these factors but their reflection in the minds of migrants that explain decisions to move. At least some segments of the receiving area have to be internationalized and be connected via information flows to recruitment areas.²⁹

Mongols emigrated to Ming territory because they believed such an action would advance their interests. In this context it is useful to briefly note the economic conditions on the Mongolian steppe on the eve of the founding of the Ming. If in the mid-thirteenth century the Mongol capital in Qaraqorum could command vast quantities of food, artisans, and other supplies from throughout Eurasia—five hundred carts of merchandise arriving daily—by the mid-fourteenth century, it was a mere shadow of its former self. With the establishment of capitals in Shangdu 上都 and Daidu 大都, the economic center of the Great Yuan *ulus* had decisively shifted southward. Those who remained on the Mongolian steppe often faced difficult economic and demographic conditions. Udo Barkmann has suggested that a precipitous fall in population triggered a sharp decline of animal husbandry.³⁰ Chinese sources such as the *Official History of the Yuan Dynasty* 元史 and Korean sources such as the *Official History of the Koryŏ Dynasty* 高麗史 confirm such a view, noting with depressing frequency loss of herds, economic privation, and even starvation among Mongol appanages in eastern Mongolia and western Manchuria during the mid-fourteenth century.³¹ The Yuan court commonly ordered that relief grain be transported from sedentary populations in Shandong, Liaodong, and Koryŏ to feed starving herdsmen on the steppe.³²

The collapse of Mongol power in China only worsened conditions on the steppe. As Serruys observed, “apparently the only thing the Mongols wanted was to get away from the poverty, the misery, the maladministration and civil wars of the post-Yüan years in Mongolia.”³³ Action by the Ming state aggravated economic dislocation on the steppe. Barkmann argues that Zhu Di’s repeated campaigns against the Mongols, early in the fifteenth century, must have disrupted economic recovery on the steppe, especially given that Ming forces generally moved along river systems, which were located in some of the most fertile areas of the steppe.³⁴ Thus, at the same time that the Ming state pursued a policy explicitly designed to prevent economic or political recovery on the steppe, it attributed Mongolian migration into Ming territory to the benevolence of the Son of Heaven or admiration for Chinese civilization.

VIII. INFORMATION AND MIGRATION

To return to Adshead’s point, noted in the introduction, about the information circuit: with the enhanced flow of information to the steppe from

the Central Plain 中原, which resulted from the establishment of the Mongol Empire, many Mongols saw China as a place of great wealth, blessed with productive fields, highly skilled artisans, and generous imperial patronage. One suspects that this perception remained fairly persistent, whether it was under Yuan or Ming rule. At the risk of an imperfect analogy, the image of the fabulous wealth that spread in Western Europe as a result of Marco Polo's depictions of China under the Mongol Empire persisted long after Toghhan-Temür left Daidu. Christopher Columbus is often said to have been carrying a dog-eared copy of the *Travels* on his voyages. Toghhan-Temür's lamentations about being forced to abandon the fabulous wealth of his capital, as recounted in the early seventeenth-century Mongolian chronicle *Altan Tobchi*, suggest an enduring image of China as a source of wealth in the eyes of Mongols. To simplify, historical memory (regardless of its accuracy) of China's wealth likely contributed to Mongolians' decisions to move to Ming territory.

A second important factor in Mongolians' calculations was information that circulated between the steppe and Ming lands. As Hoerder notes, some measure of "internationalization" of information is important in decisions related to migration (who, when, under what conditions, etc.). The information moved along several conduits. Perhaps the most fundamental was the series of informal channels through which people, goods, and information flowed throughout the borderlands. Despite the stringent laws restricting movement across the border which are evident in the *Ming Code* 明律, a wealth of evidence shows that the northern border was porous. Trading, hunting, logging, collecting ginseng, human trafficking, and other prohibited activities took place on a regular basis, facilitating the flow of information (much of which was undoubtedly wrong) across the border.

A second important source of information about China in the steppe was the Ming state itself. The central government and border authorities regularly dispatched envoys, including civil, military, and eunuch officials, into Manchuria, the steppe, Central Asia, Koryö, and beyond, to gather intelligence, relay announcements from the throne, and engage in diplomacy. Whether the envoys were Jurchens, Mongols, Huihui 回回, Koreans, or "Han" 漢 subjects serving the Ming state, they conveyed information and material objects to the steppe. Often their mission was in fact to recruit influential men and their followers to form alliances with the Ming. A critical motivational tool was description (or testimony from men who hailed from the steppe) of the privileged lives that previous émigrés enjoyed in the Ming—the prestigious titles, the stable income from the throne, the social status in border towns or even in the capital, the opportunity to advance through

outstanding service in the military or in the diplomatic corps. Such thinking no doubt informed Hongwu's decision to support in handsome fashion his captive, the young grandson of Toghhan-Temür, Maidiribala, for several years in Nanjing before dispatching him as a spokesman to the steppe;³⁵ or to send Nailawu (who had been a "guest" of the Ming court for a decade) to negotiate the surrender of his former liege Naghachu, the most powerful military figure on the steppe still at least nominally loyal to the Yuan court.³⁶

Mongols established their own networks of information. Prospective Mongolian émigrés might garner information about current conditions in various places in China through fellow Mongols. Other sources were the Mongolian, Jurchen, Korean, and other envoys dispatched by their respective leaders who traveled to Ming territory, especially those who sojourned in the capital. Although their movements were restricted, such envoys traveled the main imperial highways, stopped at dozens of lesser towns to rest and trade, and finally arrived in Beijing where they were guests of the throne. The details of their activities in the capital (beyond eating, drinking, sleeping, and trading) are poorly recorded. Although the Ming state periodically attempted to curtail their movements, it seems reasonable to assume that these envoys returned home with tales of their experiences in one of the major urban centers in the world—what they had seen, heard, eaten, or drunk, who they had met, the patronage politics of the court, and whatever they might glean of the status of Mongols in the service of the Ming state.

Other first-hand sources of Mongolian intelligence on China were raiding parties across the border. Such information was no doubt uneven and highly fragmentary; however, observant warriors had the chance to learn something of local economic conditions, the condition of livestock and horses, stockpiles of grain, and the state of military preparations. Finally, Chinese Ming subjects who joined the Mongols, voluntarily or through coercion, provided the Mongols with detailed, if not necessarily representative, information about the Ming.³⁷ As the late Hok-lam Chan noted, former Ming subjects regularly served as translators and advisors for neighboring peoples and polities during tribute missions to the Ming court.³⁸ Throughout the life of the dynasty, the Ming government remained keenly interested in debriefing subjects who had returned (regardless of the circumstances) from the steppe to learn more of political, economic, and military conditions among various Mongolian groups. It seems likely that Mongol leaders were similarly eager for timely information.

Thus, while steppe understanding of conditions within Ming territory was incomplete and no doubt often corrupted in the many stages of

transmission, Mongolians pondering migration to China did not make their decisions blindly or arbitrarily. They, like other migrants in other places and other times, sifted through the information at their disposal, weighed economic opportunities against risks, considered social (or behavioral) norms, and braced themselves for the unknown (or for the lesser known).³⁹ One reflection of continuing ties is that many Mongols and other former Yuan subjects frequently expressed a strong preference to be settled in areas with longstanding Mongol and/or Central Asian communities, many of which had begun as military garrisons during the thirteenth or early fourteenth centuries.⁴⁰

Finally, it should be noted that despite careful consideration of information and use of ties to existing communities within Ming territory, doubt and a sense of vulnerability often shaped the behavior of Mongolian migrants to the Ming. In 1409, a large group of important Mongol leaders and their followers indicated a wish to relocate to Ming lands. They wavered, however, until Yongle offered reassurances. The emperor dispatched one of his senior court ministers to travel to the northwestern corner of the empire to coordinate the final campaign of persuasion. Yongle also ordered that Batu-Temür, a Mongolian leader with personal ties to the prospective immigrants and who in 1405 had allied himself with the Ming, assist in allaying their concerns.⁴¹ As a result of such efforts, the Mongol leaders and their followers relocated to Ming territory.

Like many recent immigrants, some Mongols felt particularly vulnerable in their new home. In 1410, a number of Mongols who had relocated to Ming territory in the northwest rose in armed revolt when they heard rumors that the Ming state planned to move them elsewhere. Whether because the rumors were unsubstantiated or because the court abandoned its plans in the face of such unrest, the Mongols were not relocated.⁴²

To recapitulate, it is important to remember that Mongol migrants chose to relocate to Ming territory. As noted above, their motives varied widely depending on specific circumstances. Some sought to escape the widespread poverty and chaos of the steppe caused by the decline and final collapse of the Mongol Empire. Some, who had grown up in Chinese cities during the Yuan period, failed to adapt to the rigors of the steppe and wished to return to lands now held by the Ming.⁴³ Some saw opportunity in the service of the Ming state, whether as warriors, translators, or diplomats. Others wished to join family members and acquaintances who had already settled in Ming territory. In any case, we should not be seduced by the rhetorical strategies of the Ming court into forgetting Mongolian agency.

IX. IMMIGRANTS AND THE MING STATE

My intention is not, however, to dismiss the importance of the Ming state in the Mongolian diaspora. Indeed, for those Mongols who ended up in Ming service, the state could exercise a formative influence. The Ming state tended to organize Mongols into military contingents composed of other men from the steppe, which were embedded in regular garrison units. Most of these were located along the northern border or in and around the two capitals of Beijing and Nanjing. Others, however, were settled far to the south, in places like Yunnan 雲南, Guangdong 廣東, and Guangxi 廣西.⁴⁴

Although conditions varied significantly throughout the realm, Ming garrisons often served several purposes beyond supplying military force. They functioned as administrative loci through which the state maintained household registration, managed extensive agricultural lands, and extracted labor for construction and infrastructure projects; they acted as economic hubs around which trade networks or markets and eventually small cities sometimes developed;⁴⁵ and they could also figure in the formation of the social and/or cultural identity of garrison inhabitants. Indigenous populations often depicted garrison populations as outsiders or newcomers, even generations after their arrivals.⁴⁶

Ming writers of various persuasions frequently associated Mongols in the service of the Ming state with their garrisons. To give one example among many, from the early sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, administrative geographies and general encyclopedias regularly mentioned the deleterious social impact of “fierce and difficult to tame” 性獷難馴 Mongols stationed in the garrisons in and around Hejian 河間, Zhending 真定, and Baoding 保定, important cities located south of the capital.⁴⁷ Although such descriptions were not necessarily accurate, they do hint at the role of military garrisons in the persistence of social perceptions, perhaps even identity. The work of Henry Serruys suggests that military garrisons provided an essential institutional framework for the preservation of Mongol communities in the northwestern region of Gansu 甘肅, where they “largely kept their national character throughout the Ming and Ch'ing periods.”⁴⁸ Military garrisons in areas closer to the capital seem to have served a similar function, with units of “Tatar troops” surviving until the very end of the Ming dynasty.⁴⁹ Martin Hejdra has noted that military garrisons sometimes functioned as language enclaves that preserved at least a portion of the language and/or dialect of relocated populations.⁵⁰

The importance of military institutions for relocated Mongolian individuals, families, and communities did not begin with the Ming. As many have noted, the Mongol imperial state relocated military units—which included not only subjugated personnel from Chinese, Turkic, Jurchen, Khitan, Armenian, Georgian, and other lands, but also “Mongols”—wherever they were needed. Indeed, one of the distinctive features of the Chinggisid state was its effective use of military units to reorganize subject populations. Although the majority of Mongol units were garrisoned in the northern half of China during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, significant contingents of Mongolian soldiers were also assigned to guard key strategic points to the south, as Tsutsumi Kazuaki has demonstrated.⁵¹ In the case of eastern Eurasia, Mongol populations were regularly registered as members of Mongol military households. The fledgling Ming state retained and expanded the hereditary military household system as an administrative apparatus through which to manage a large, potentially disruptive segment of its male subjects, their families, and the lands they farmed. Put in slightly different terms, the Ming state adapted Yuan dynasty institutional precedents to regulate continued Mongolian migration.

X. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Early Ming emperors tried to carve out a place for themselves in a world that still bore the deep impress of the Mongol Empire. The territory they seized was home to hundreds of thousands of Mongols and many other groups that had migrated, voluntarily or through coercion, during the period of Mongol domination. Rather than attempting to repatriate these populations, the Ming state went to some lengths to turn their skills to the advantage of the new dynasty. Indeed, early Ming emperors encouraged further Mongolian migration, which they then trumpeted as evidence of their legitimacy at home and abroad. In this sense, Ming sovereigns resembled other rulers in Eurasia during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries who attempted to incorporate Mongolian populations into their budding polities.

At the same time, it is important to remember that the carefully crafted Ming narrative of Mongolian migration represented only one part of the larger story of the Mongolian diaspora. The generation of the diaspora long pre-dated the founding of the Ming, continued as much outside as under state control, and was driven more powerfully by the Mongols’ imperatives (including those of individuals, families, and larger groups) than the Ming’s.

Despite the growing prominence of anti-Other rhetoric from the mid-fifteenth century onward, which demanded strict lines of separation between Huaxia and aliens (華夷之界 or 華夷之辨), Mongolian migrants and their descendents continued to hold key positions not only in garrisons on the border and in the hinterlands but also in the upper echelons of dynastic military administration in the capital. Developments during the last century of the Ming dynasty conspired to obscure the critical importance of the Mongolian diaspora in particular, and more broadly the continued centrality of the Mongol Empire and its legacy, for the formative period of the Ming dynasty.

NOTES

I would like to thank Professor Thomas Allsen for reading a draft of this paper and offering much-appreciated suggestions, Professor Yoon Eunsook for her insightful comments and helpful suggestions for future research, and Professor Kim Ho-dong for offering me the opportunity to share my ideas at “Conquest, Migration, and Cultural Exchanges in Central Eurasia,” the Third International Symposium of the Center for Central Eurasian Studies, Seoul National University, 2010.

¹ Udo Barkmann suggests a figure of between 300,000 and 340,000 Mongols. See “Some Comments on the Consequences of the Decline of the Mongol Empire on the Social Development of the Mongols,” in *The Mongol Empire and Its Legacy*, ed. Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David Morgan (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 276. Hagiwara Junpei 萩原淳平 held that a total of 600,000 people surrendered to the Ming from the Yuan, including the regions of Mongolia and Manchuria. See Hagiwara Junpei, “Minsho no Hoppen ni tsuite” 明初の北辺について, *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 東洋史研究 19, no. 2 (1960): 29.

² David M. Robinson, “Negotiating a Dynastic Transition: The Early Ming Court and the Chinggisids” (paper presented at “Revisiting the Family and the State in Chinggisid and Post-Chinggisid Central Eurasia, 13th–19th Centuries,” University of Indiana, September 2008).

³ As Zhou Song 周松 has rightly observed, because of Yongle’s upbringing and previous interactions with Mongol personnel as the Yan Prince, he generally felt more comfortable with Mongols and gave them positions of greater responsibility and power. See Zhou Song, “Ru Ming Mengguren zhengzhi juese de zhuanhuan yu ronghe” 入明蒙古人政治角色的轉換與融和, *Beifang minzu daxue xuebao* 北方民族大學學報 (Zhaxue shehuixue ban 哲學社會科學版) 1 (2009): 27–32, esp. 31. Hagiwara stressed that Yongle’s ability to win the support of Mongols who were already in the service of the Ming state was of critical importance to his success in the civil war against Jianwen (“Minsho no Hoppen,” 38–45).

⁴ Competition on the steppe that forced defeated groups into flight was a well-established pattern of migration with a history of several millennia by this time. For brief comments, see William McNeil, “Human Migration in Historical Perspective,” *Population and Development Review* 10, no. 1 (1984): 4–5.

⁵ For an insightful case study from China, see Paul Smith, “Family, Landsmann, and Status-Group Affinity in Refugee Mobility Strategies: The Mongol Invasions and the Diaspora of

Sichuanese Elites, 1230–1330,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 52, no. 2 (1992): 665–708.

⁶ For detailed consideration of an earlier example of a relocated noble house with steppe origins that reestablished itself in a strikingly different physical environment and cultural milieu, see Michal Biran, *The Empire of the Qara Khitai in Eurasian History: Between China and the Islamic World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁷ Biran, *The Empire of the Qara Khitai*, 74–86.

⁸ Peter Golden, “I Will Give the People unto Thee’: The Činggisid Conquests and Their Aftermath in the Turkic World,” *Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 3rd ser., 10, no. 1 (2000): 21–41; Charles Halperin, “The Kipchak Connection: The Ilkhans, the Mamluks and Ayn Jalut,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 63, no. 2 (2000): 229–45.

⁹ Herbert Franke, “Tibetans in Yuan China,” in *China Under Mongol Rule*, ed. John Langlois (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 296–328; Morris Rossabi, “The Muslims in the Early Yüan Dynasty,” in *China under Mongol Rule*, 257–95; Igor de Rachewiltz, “A Preliminary Investigation of Turco–Mongol Relations in the 13th and 14th Centuries,” in *China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 281–310; Michael Brose, “Uyghur Technologists of Writing and Literacy in Mongol China,” *T’oung-pao* 91, no. 4/5 (2005): 396–435; Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West* (Harlow: Pearson/Longman, 2005), see esp. 256–328.

¹⁰ Thomas Allsen, *Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); *Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

¹¹ Thomas T. Allsen, “Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia,” in *Eurasian Nomads as Agents of Cultural Change*, ed. Michal Biran and Reuven Amitai (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2012).

¹² For integration under the Mongols, see Thomas Allsen, “Ever Closer Encounters: Appropriation of Culture and the Apportionment of Peoples in the Mongol Empire,” *Journal of Early Modern History* 1 (1997): 2–23; Michal Biran, “The Mongol Transformation: From the Steppe to Eurasian Empire,” *Medieval Encounters* 10, nos. 1–3 (2004): 339–61.

¹³ S. A. M. Adshead, *Central Asia in World History* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 70–77; the quotation appears on 70–71.

¹⁴ For the rare exception, see David Christian, “Silk Roads or Steppe Roads?” *Journal of World History* 11, no. 1 (2000): 1–26.

¹⁵ Beatrice Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 33–36.

¹⁶ Stephen Dale, *The Garden of the Eight Paradises: Babur and the Culture of Empire in Central Asia, Afghanistan and India (1483–1530)* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 16–17.

¹⁷ Golden, “I Will Give the People,” 36. Biran (“Mongol Transformation,” 357) notes that the dislocated peoples including the Uyghurs, Khitans, Tanguts, and others often “coalesced around the names of particular Mongol princes.”

¹⁸ David M. Robinson, “Empire’s Shadow: The Ming Court in Eurasia” (unpublished manuscript).

¹⁹ Sugiyama Masaaki 杉山正明, “Chūō Yūrasia no rekishi kōzu: sekaishi o tsunaida mono” 中央ユーラシアの歴史構図—世界史をつないだもの, in *Iwanami kōza sekaishi* 岩波講座世界史, vol. 11, *Chūō Yūrasia no tōgō* 中央ユーラシアの統合 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1997), 3–89, 67–72.

²⁰ Wu Songdi, *Zhongguo yiminshi disijuan Liao Song Jin Yuan shiqi* 中國移民史第四卷遼宋金元時期 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 603.

²¹ The traditional Mongolian chronicle *Asaraghchi* holds that approximately 100,000 Mongols withdrew to the steppe after the fall of Daidu, while 300,000 remained behind (Barkmann, “Some Comments,” 276). Based on Chinese materials, Cao Shuji 曹樹基 has estimated that late in the fourteenth century, nearly 300,000 of the 360,000 people in civilian households in Beijing

Prefecture were Mongols or their direct descendents; see Cao Shuji, *Zhongguo renkoushi disijuan Ming shiqi* 中國人口史第四卷明時期 (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2000), 257. Beijing Prefecture included the former Yuan capital Daidu and its environs.

²² David M. Robinson, *Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven: Rebellion and the Economy of Violence in Mid-Ming China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 31.

²³ See, among many others, Serruys, "The Mongols in China during the Hung-wu Period," *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 11 (1959); "Land Grants to the Mongols in China, 1400–1460," *Monumenta Serica* 25 (1966): 394–405; "Were the Ming Against the Mongols Settling in North China?" *Oriens Extremus* 6, no. 2 (1959): 131–59; "A Mongol Settlement in North China at the end of the 16th Century," *Central Asiatic Journal* 4 (1959): 237–78; "The Mongols of Kansu during the Ming," *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 10 (1955); "Mongols Ennobled during the Early Ming," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 22 (1959): 209–60. During the last few decades, several Chinese scholars have also examined the settlement of Mongolian populations in Ming territory, but, as is all too common, seemingly with little or no knowledge (or at least no acknowledgement) of Serruys's vast corpus of work. See Baorijigen 寶日吉根, "Shishu Mingchao dui suoxia jingnei Mengguren de zhengce" 試述明朝對所轄境內蒙古人的政策, *Neimenggu shehui kexue* 內蒙古社會科學 6 (1984): 66–69; Cai Zhichun 蔡志純, "Mingchao qianqi dui Menggu de minzu zhengce" 明朝前期對蒙古的民族政策, *Xibei shidi* 西北史地 3 (1984): 57–62; Wang Xiong 王雄, "Ming Hongwushi dui Menggu renzhong de zhaofu he anzhi" 明洪武時對蒙古人眾的招撫和安置, *Neimenggu daxue xuebao* 內蒙古大學學報 4 (1987): 71–84; Di Fusheng 邸富生, "Shilun Mingchao chuqi juzhu zaineidi de Mengguren" 試論明朝初期居住在內地的蒙古人, *Minzu yanjiu* 民族研究 3 (1996): 70–77; Peng Yong 彭勇, "Mingdai 'Daguan' zai neidi weisuo de fenbu jiqi shehui shenghuo" 明代"達官"在內地衛所的分布及其社會生活, *Neimenggu shehui kexue* 內蒙古社會科學 (Hanwenban 漢文版) 24, no. 1 (2003): 15–19; Ma Mingda 馬明達, "Mingdai Guangzhou de 'Daguanbing'" 明代廣州的"達官兵", *Huizu yanjiu* 回族研究 3 (2005): 92–99; Peng Yong 彭勇, "Lun Mingdai zhongshunying guanjun de mingyun bianqian" 論明代忠順營官軍的命運變遷, *Zhongzhou xuekan* 中州學刊 6 (2009): 183–89; Zhou Song, "Ru Ming Mengguren zhengzhi jue se de zhuanhuan yu ronghe."

²⁴ One is reminded of the Qing court's narrative of the Torghut (Kalmyk) Mongols' return from Russian territory in 1771, which was promulgated in a number of imperially commissioned stelae in Ili and Chengde, the Qing summer villa. Between 150,000 and 170,000 desperate Torghuts fled Russian oppression in the hope of finding greener pastures in Zungharia. In the words of Peter Perdue, "After a horrifying journey, attacked incessantly by Russians, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz, and starving in trackless deserts, having lost nearly all their animals, the Torghuts arrived at the Qing border with only 70,000 people" (*China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 491–92). The Qing court portrayed the arrival of the Torghuts as "returning in order to submit," as if that had been the Torghuts' intention from the very outset. As Perdue argues, this episode was just one instance of a far broader pattern of narrative hegemony, whereby the Qing court sought to establish definitive accounts of pivotal events that highlighted the final and inevitable nature of Qing conquests. See also his comments on the "hegemony of inscription," in Perdue, "Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century China, Russia, and Mongolia," *Modern Asian Studies* 30, no. 4 (1996): 783–86.

²⁵ Qi Wenying 奇文瑛 has calculated that 78 of the 88 incidents of surrendering former populations recorded in the *Ming Veritable Records* for 1370 to 1398 were described as former Yuan personnel. The remainder were variously called "Tatars," "men of the Hu," or "Hu troops." See Qi Wenying, "Ming Hongwu shiqi neiqian Mengguren bianxi" 明洪武時期內遷蒙古人辨析, *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 中國邊疆史地研究 14, no. 2 (2004): 59–65, see esp. 59. Qi's central and persuasive argument is that many, perhaps a majority, of "Mongols" who relocated to Ming territory during the early Ming were lower-level Chinese bureaucrats or Turkenstani (*se mu ren*)

officials of the Yuan state. My thanks to Professor Yoon Eunsook for drawing this article to my attention.

²⁶ In a study on Mongols in Xuanhua in the late sixteenth century, Serruys noted, “A return to Mongolia was invariably labeled ‘rebellion,’ but ‘rebellion’ was often ‘local outbreaks of discontent.’” See Serruys, “A Mongol Settlement in North China at the End of the 16th Century,” *Central Asiatic Journal* 4 (1959): 237–78, quotations appear on 239.

²⁷ *Ming Yingzong shilu* 明英宗實錄 (facsimile reproduction of *Guoli Beiping tushuguan cang hongge chaoben*, 133 vols. (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1961–66)), 37.1b 正統二年十二月戊午.

²⁸ *Ming Yingzong shilu*, 35.4b 正統二年十月丙寅.

²⁹ Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 17.

³⁰ Barkmann, “Some Comments,” 275–76. William McNeil (“Human Migration,” 9–10) has also drawn attention to “a drastic depopulation of the Eurasian steppe” at this time, which eventually reversed the flow of people from the steppe into the sedentary world, such that migration came to be characterized by “encroachment on the grasslands by pioneer settlers.” McNeil attributes the depopulation to the introduction of bubonic bacillus.

³¹ Chen Gaohua 陳高華, “Yuandai de liumin wenti” 元代的流民問題, *Yuanshi luncong* 元史論叢, 4 (1992): 132–47, esp. 141–42, 146.

³² David M. Robinson, *Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia under the Mongols* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 35–36.

³³ Serruys, “Were the Ming against the Mongols settling in North China?” 135.

³⁴ Barkmann, “Some Comments,” 278.

³⁵ Baorijigen, “Shishu Mingchao,” 68.

³⁶ Wang, “Ming Hongwushi,” 81.

³⁷ Mid-sixteenth-century observers such as Zhang Juzheng (1525–82), Wang Chonggu (1515–89), and others were deeply worried about such men, referring to them as “rebels” who supplied ambitious Mongol leaders with information and strategies. Writing in 1552, the senior court minister Xu Jie 徐階 (1503–83) complained that because of what he termed Chinese “traitors,” “the relative strength of our troops, the strategic importance of sites, the relative wealth of the people, there is none that they do not know.” See Xu Jie, “Lun bing shi” 論兵事, in idem, *Shi jing tang ji* 世經堂集, 2.6b (Wanli edition held at Beijing University Library; repr. in *Si ku quan shu cun mu cong shu, ji bu*, vol. 79 (Jinan: Qi Lu shushe, 1997), 371). The return of one such “rebel,” Zhao Quan, was a central Ming demand in negotiations over peace and trade with the Mongol leader Altan Khan.

³⁸ Hok-lam Chan, “The ‘Chinese Barbarian Officials’ in the Foreign Tributary Missions to China during the Ming Dynasty,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 88, no. 3 (1968): 411–18.

³⁹ In terms of balancing “strategic considerations” and “behavioral norms,” the decision to migrate bears comparison with the decision to enter into a labor relation with an employer. For discussion of strategic considerations and behavioral norms in the context of labor history, see Marcel van der Linden, *Workers of the World: Essays towards a Global Labor History* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 54–55.

⁴⁰ Qi, “Ming Hongwu shiqi neiqian Mengguren bianxi,” 64.

⁴¹ Zhou, “Ru Ming,” 29–30.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 30–31.

⁴³ Hagiwara Junpei argued that this, rather than military defeat, was the most fundamental reason for the large number of Mongols who surrendered to the Ming state. See Hagiwara, “Minsho no Hoppen,” 19–29; *Mindai Mōkoshi kenkyū* 明代蒙古史研究 (Kyoto: Dōhōsha, 1980), 6–20.

⁴⁴ Serruys, “The Mongols in China”; Peng, “Mingdai”; Di, “Shilun,” 72–74.

⁴⁵ Peng Qingzhou 彭清洲 suggests (but does not prove) that the opening of new agricultural

lands through the military colonies stimulated economic growth in border regions with large non-Han populations: "Ming Chengzu minzu zhengce shulun" 明成祖民族政策述論, *Zhongyang minzu daxue xuebao* 中央民族大學學報 4 (1990): 66–70, esp. 69. Chen Xuewen 陳學文 argues that the mobilization of militia men from Yiwu (who were outside the garrison system) to diverse areas of the empire contributed to the formation of Yiwu's renowned trade networks. See Chen, "Yiwubing, Qijiajun, yu Mingdai yuWo zhanzheng ji qita" 義烏兵, 戚家軍與明代禦倭戰爭及其他, *Ming Qing lunwen* 明清論叢 10 (2010): 172–80, esp. 178.

⁴⁶ Over time, some military households became thoroughly integrated into local society. For an examination of the "localization" of Jinxiang Garrison (Wenzhou) during the Ming and Qing periods, see Lin Changzhang 林昌丈, "Ming Qing dongnan yanhai weisuo junhu de difanghua" 明清東南沿海衛所軍戶的地方化, *Zhongguo lishi dili luncong* 中國歷史地理論叢 24, no. 4 (2009): 115–25.

⁴⁷ David Robinson, "Images of Subject Mongols under the Ming Dynasty," *Late Imperial China* 25, no. 1 (June 2004): 96–99.

⁴⁸ Serruys, "The Mongols of Kansu during the Ming," *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 10 (1955): 341.

⁴⁹ Peng Yong 彭勇, "Lun Mingdai zhongshunying guanjun de mingyun bianqian," 187.

⁵⁰ Martin Heijdra, "A Preliminary Note on Cultural Geography and Ming History," *Ming Studies* 34 (1995): 19–21.

⁵¹ For instance, see Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing (Xiao Qiqing), "Yuandai de zhenrong zhidu" 元代的鎮戍制度, in *Yaoshi Congwu xiansheng jinian lunji* 姚師從吾先生紀念論集 (Taipei, 1971); reprinted in idem, *Yuandaishi xintan* 元代史新探 (Taipei: Xinwenfeng chubanshe, 1983), 118–19; *The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1978), 51–53; Tsutsumi Kazuaki 堤一昭, "Dai Gen urusu no Kōnan chūtongun" 大元ウルスの江南駐屯軍, *Ōsaka gaikokugo daigaku ronshū* 大阪外国語大学論集 19 (1988): 173–98.

