

Koryŏ–Khitan Relations and Khitan Cultural Influence in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries

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I. INTRODUCTION

King T'aejo (r. 918–43), the founder of the Koryŏ dynasty (918–1392), was said on his deathbed to have imparted a set of instructions known as the *Ten Injunctions* 訓要十條. These covered many important topics—such as Buddhism, geomancy, the security of the state, and dynastic succession—and were intended to provide political guidance for his successors in governing the state. In the fourth of the *Ten Injunctions*, the king had the following to say about the peoples and cultures of Koryŏ's neighbors:

In the past we have always had a deep attachment for the ways of [Tang] China and all of our institutions have been modeled upon those of T'ang [Tang]. But our country occupies a different geographical location and our people's character is different from that of the [Han] Chinese. Hence, there is no reason to strain ourselves unreasonably to copy the Chinese way. Khitan is a nation of savage beasts, and its language and customs are also different. Its dress and institutions should never be copied.

[惟我東方舊慕唐風，文物禮樂悉遵其制，殊方異土人性各異，不必苟同，契丹是禽獸之國，風俗不同言語，亦異衣冠制度，慎勿效焉。]¹

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A number of authors, including the Japanese scholar Imanishi Ryu and more recently Remco Breuker, have asserted that the *Ten Injunctions* was a fabrication created during the reign of King Hyōnjong (1009–31).² Whether the document dates from the late tenth or early eleventh century, this (alleged) statement by King T'aejo has often been invoked as clear evidence of deep prejudice and hostility towards the Khitans during the early Koryō period.

In the early tenth century the rapidly expanding Khitan Empire represented the greatest threat to Koryō's security. Beginning in the late tenth century, there were several major invasions into Koryō and frequent border clashes. Given these less-than-amicable relations, it is not surprising that the *Koryōsa*, the most important and often the only available source for many aspects of the period, paints a very unfavorable and hostile picture of the Khitans, who were looked down upon as culturally inferior "barbarians." Koryō and the Khitan³ had come to terms with each other by the mid-eleventh century, and peaceful relations were maintained by regular diplomatic contacts until the fall of the Khitan Empire in the early twelfth century. Yet historical sources reveal very little about economic relations and cultural interactions between the two nations.

The open conflicts, troubled political relations, and cultural prejudices that existed between Koryō and the Khitan certainly would not have been conducive to cultural interaction. Because of the paucity of documentary evidence, scholars often assumed that there were few cultural or economic interactions. Cultural boundaries, however, are fluid, and do not always conform to rigid political borders. A careful reading of historical sources and recent archaeological and art-historical studies on cultural relics provides hints that the Khitans had considerable cultural influence on Koryō. Indeed, the passage in the *Ten Injunctions* quoted above could be interpreted as saying that there *was* considerable Khitan influence on clothing and institutions, which the Koryō king (whether T'aejo in the tenth century, or Hyōnjong in the eleventh) could not ignore. This paper will first present a brief overview of Koryō–Khitan political relations and of how these may have influenced cultural interactions, and then offer a few examples of Khitan cultural influence that have largely been neglected.

II. KORYŎ–KHITAN RELATIONS: HOSTILITY AND ACCOMMODATION

After the fall of the Tang Empire in 907, China descended into the chaotic Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period (907–60). It was during this time that the Khitans developed into the paramount power in Northeast Asia and the Mongolian steppe.⁴ They gained control of Manchuria by conquering Parhae 渤海 in 926, and became the dominant power in North China when they overran the capital of the Later Jin dynasty in 946.

Koryŏ's official contact with the Khitan began during this chaotic period in the early tenth century: in the second month of 922, only four years after King T'aejo had established the dynasty, the Khitan court dispatched an embassy that brought presents of the steppe such as camels and woolen fabrics.⁵ We do not know anything about the Koryŏ court's reaction to this first Khitan embassy; however, when the second Khitan embassy arrived in 942, almost twenty years later, King T'aejo took the drastic and hostile action of banishing its thirty members to a remote island and letting their gift of fifty camels to starve to death under a bridge in the capital city of Kaegyŏng.⁶

Such harsh treatment of foreign envoys, while not unprecedented in premodern Northeast Asia, was very unusual. What had caused the Koryŏ court to manifest such utter animosity towards the Khitans? Was this a natural outcome of Koryŏ's view of the Khitan as a "nation of savage beasts" of untrustworthy nature? As Breuker has asserted, this hostility did not necessarily mirror the anti-Khitān sentiments manifest during the reign of King T'aejo, but reflected the feeling of enmity that arose later on, after several major Khitan invasions in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries.⁷ Other scholars have pointed to alleged marriage ties between Koryŏ and Parhae as recorded in the *Zizhi tongjian* 資治通鑑 (285.9298–99) as the possible cause of this enmity. They argue that King T'aejo's personal hatred of the Khitans was due to his outrage at their destruction of the Parhae state, with which Koryŏ supposedly maintained marriage ties.⁹ However, there is no record of such a marriage tie in the sources, and scholars and historians of the later period, including the prominent late-Koryŏ scholar Yi Chehyŏn, have expressed strong doubts about the existence of such connections, since this royal marriage appears only in the *Zizhi tongjian*.⁹ On the contrary, the Koryŏ court does not appear to have ever maintained friendly relations with the Manchurian state of Parhae, and it even dispatched a congratulatory embassy a month after the Khitan conquest of Parhae in 926.¹⁰

The fall of Parhae in 926 did not make Koryŏ and the Khitan into immediate neighbors, since several Jurchen tribes continued to occupy the buffer region between the Chŏngchŏn 清川江 and Amnok (Yalu) rivers 鴨綠江. By this time, the Khitan court was surely aware of Koryŏ's expansion into Manchuria. King T'aejo publicly proclaimed his desire to expand and recover the ancient territories of Koguryŏ, and began a systematic expansion and strengthening of his military position by designating P'yŏngyang, the ancient capital of the Koguryŏ, as the dynasty's Western Capital 西京.¹¹ There was also a possibility that Koryŏ would encourage rebellion among the disaffected Parhae population in the Liaodong region.¹² At the same time, Koryŏ was also troubled by the rapidly increasing Khitan influence near its northern border. As they expanded in opposite directions, the two states soon came to view each other as an enemy and a serious military threat.

By the time of T'aejo's death in 943, Koryŏ had expanded its northern border to the Chŏngchŏn River, and King Chŏngjong (r. 945–49) even planned to relocate the capital to P'yŏngyang.¹³ Koryŏ also organized the Resplendent Army 光軍, which supposedly numbered 300,000, and King Kwangjong (949–75) continued the push toward the Amnok River and maintained several garrison forts across the Chŏngchŏn River.¹⁴ Perhaps it was this show of force, resolve, and preparation by Koryŏ in the early and mid-tenth century that dissuaded the Khitan from launching military expeditions at the time.¹⁵

After the second Khitan embassy of 942, there is no record of any further official contact until the 980s, when the Khitans launched two major expeditions against the Jurchen tribes and the two small states of the Later Parhae 後渤海 and Chŏngan'guk (Ding'an'guo) 定安國 in the Amnok River region¹⁶—these had been established by people formerly of Parhae who professed themselves the legitimate successors to that fallen state and actively sought an anti-Khitan alliance with the Song.¹⁷

The Khitan had apparently planned military action against Koryŏ. In fact, the original target of the Khitan campaign of 985 was not the Jurchen tribes but Koryŏ.¹⁸ Koryŏ was fully aware of the growing Khitan military threat and was informed of the impending invasion by Chŏe Kwangyun, a Koryŏ student who had been taken prisoner by the Khitans in 947 when he was studying in the Later Jin capital.¹⁹ Around this time, Chŏe Sungno (927–89), one of the most prominent political figures in the Early Koryŏ period, emphasized military preparedness to deal with the threat on the northern border as the first point in his famous *Twenty-eight Points on Current Affairs* 時務二十八條 he submitted to the throne in 982.²⁰

Although Koryŏ represented a serious potential threat, the Khitan could not bring much pressure to bear, as it was engaged in fierce battles with the Song during the last two decades of the tenth century. Both the Khitan and the Song were aware of the crucial role that Koryŏ could play in the balance of power. Just before the military showdown between the Song and the Khitan in 986, both states dispatched embassies to entice or discourage Koryŏ's involvement. The Song embassy of the fifth month of 985 attempted to convince Koryŏ to join them in a military alliance, appealing to the need to defend their "common culture" and promising the spoils of war. In contrast, the Khitan embassy of the first month of 986 merely tried to secure Koryŏ's neutrality. The *Koryŏsa* records that Koryŏ ignored the Khitan overture and agreed to help the Song,²¹ but ultimately kept out of the Song–Khitan conflict of 986. Still, the Khitan court was now acutely aware of the fact that Koryŏ had to be neutralized before it could concentrate all its military resources on the war against the Song.

Finally, in 993, the Khitan general Xiao Hengde 蕭恒德 led a massive invasion force that supposedly numbered 800,000²² and crossed the Amnok River.²³ This was the first serious foreign invasion since the establishment of the dynasty. Koryŏ had been vigilant in preparing against the Khitan threat from the early days of the dynasty, but several decades of relative peace may have fostered a false sense of security. In fact, Koryŏ had been given advance warning by the Jurchens, but the court had dismissed it as another case of the deceitful Jurchens' attempts to mislead them.²⁴ Koryŏ failed to stop the initial Khitan advance, and the Khitan army scored a victory in the first battle on the northern bank of the Chŏngchŏn River. However, instead of pressing south toward the capital, Xiao stopped his advance and sent several communications demanding Koryŏ's immediate surrender.

In one of his messages to the Koryŏ court, Xiao declared,

Your state (Koryŏ) originated from the territory of Silla. The [former] territories of Koguryŏ [now] belong to us, but you have encroached [these lands]. Moreover, your state shares a common border with us but serves [instead] the Song across the sea. These are the reasons for today's military action. If you cede the land [to us] and restore relations, there will not be any trouble.

[汝國興新羅地，高句麗之地我所有也，而汝侵蝕之，又與我連壤，而越海事宋，故有今日之師，若割地以獻，而修朝聘，可無事矣。]²⁵

In reply, Koryŏ claimed itself to be the legitimate successor to Koguryŏ and accused the Khitans of occupying Koryŏ territory. As for the cessation

of normal relations, Koryŏ blamed obstruction by the Jurchen tribes that occupied the land between the Chŏngchŏn and Amnok rivers. The objective of the Khitan invasion was to ensure Koryŏ's neutrality, and Xiao certainly did not want to risk a prolonged military action in Koryŏ. Koryŏ was able to persuade Xiao to withdraw his force and, ostensibly for the purpose of securing safe diplomatic passage, obtained the Khitan court's explicit consent to push out the Jurchens and incorporate the land into Koryŏ territory.²⁶ Koryŏ promptly sent an army to drive out the Jurchens and secured the region in 994–95.²⁷

In return for the concessions, Koryŏ did accept the nominal status of a “tributary” to the Khitan. Koryŏ was to sever its diplomatic ties with the Song, and in the second month of 994 Koryŏ switched to the Khitan calendar, discarding the Song calendar it had used since 963.²⁸ This did not lead to peaceful relations, though, and only a few months later, in the sixth month of 994, the Koryŏ court once again sent an envoy to the Song urging military action against the Khitan.²⁹ However, in 994 the Song was trying to establish peaceful relations with the Khitan,³⁰ and thus it refused Koryŏ's overtures.³¹

Disappointed by the Song refusal, Koryŏ broke off official relations and sought to deal with the Khitan presence on its northern border.³² Koryŏ dispatched three tribute missions from 994 to 995 and sent ten boys to study the Khitan language.³³ In 995 King Sŏngjong even proposed a marriage alliance with the Khitan court and was said to have been granted as his consort a daughter of Xiao Hengde and Princess Yueguo, the third daughter of the Khitan Jingzong 景宗 (r. 969–82). While the *Koryŏsa* recorded that the Khitan court “approved marriage” (許嫁), the *Liaoshi* indicated that the princess had “married down” (下嫁). According to Khitan sources, Xiao Hengde had married Princess Yueguo in 983, so their daughter would have been at most twelve years old in 995,³⁴ and without any record of a Khitan princess ever coming to Koryŏ,³⁵ the royal marriage between the Koryŏ king and the Khitan princess may never have actually taken place. On the other hand, the Koryŏ court dispatched a special condolence embassy upon the death of the Princess Yueguo in 996, and the only possible reason would be that the princess was indeed King Sŏngjong's mother-in-law.³⁶ Whichever may have been the case, the marriage (proposal) shows that the Koryŏ court was for the time being pursuing a policy of conciliation.

A tense peace was maintained for a few years, but relations rapidly deteriorated as the Khitan and the Song signed the Treaty of Shanyuan 澶淵之盟 in 1005, after which the Khitan court was able to remove troops from the Song border and deploy them against Koryŏ. The Khitans launched

a major expedition in 1010 and again in 1018, and there were almost continuous minor battles and skirmishes throughout the early eleventh century. By the early 1020s, both sides had won and lost important battles, and it was becoming clear that neither side could expect a decisive victory. The cost of war was beginning to put a severe strain on the finances of both states. Koryŏ tried to accommodate the Khitān demands but resolutely resisted any incursion into its territory. In the eighth month of 1029, after twenty-one years' work, Koryŏ finally finished the outer wall around its capital.³⁷ In 1030 Koryŏ tried once again to enlist assistance from the Song,³⁸ but the Chinese were now content with the peaceful relations they had enjoyed since 1005. Disappointed by another refusal, Koryŏ broke off official relations with the Song and did not resume them until 1070.

While the mostly trouble-free Koryŏ–Song relations have often been interpreted in terms of the tribute system, the reality may have been quite different. Many Song Chinese officials seemed to have convinced themselves that Koryŏ's admiration of Chinese culture naturally made it a potential military ally against dangerous "barbarians" like the Khitāns and Jurchens. This attitude can clearly be detected in the letter by the Song emperor Taizong 太宗 (r. 967–97) which appealed to Koryŏ to rise to the "defense of their common culture" against the Khitāns.³⁹ However, while Koryŏ may have had "a deep attachment for the ways of [Tang] China," it did not subscribe to the notion that Chinese political superiority was the natural or universal order of things to which it had to conform. The influential early Koryŏ official Chŏe Sŭngno (927–89) would use the neutral term "Western Dynasty" (西朝), not "Superior State" (上國), to refer to Song China,⁴⁰ and the Koryŏ court did not afford any special treatment to the Song embassies as compared to those from the Khitān or the Jurchen Jin.⁴¹

Thus, cultural "similarity" or the tribute system cannot account for the amicable relations between Koryŏ and the Song. Rather, we need to recognize the political and military balance of power in the Northeast Asian geopolitical configuration during the tenth and eleventh centuries. The powerful Khitān Empire was a clear military threat and a common enemy of Koryŏ and the Song, and these two states naturally came to view each other as potential allies. Koryŏ had little to fear from the Song Chinese dynasty, with which it did not share a common border or frontier region. They did face each other across the Yellow Sea, but there were as yet no territorial, military, or economic conflicts over the control of maritime resources or trade routes. In short, the multistate geopolitical configuration had pushed Koryŏ and the Song towards friendly relations. In the end, both pursued pragmatic

and realist policies and were unwilling to risk their own security by getting involved in unnecessary military confrontations with the Khitans.

Koryŏ's hostility toward the Khitan was not merely due to its contempt for a "barbaric" culture. The primary factor was Khitan military pressure, as the border problem between Koryŏ and the Khitan had never been completely resolved. Having suffered several major invasions, Koryŏ remained suspicious, and the border regions were closely monitored and controlled. From 1033 to 1044 Koryŏ constructed defensive stone walls that rose a little over 25 feet (7.6 meters) in height and eventually stretched from the mouth of the Amnok to the East Sea.⁴² It is no coincidence that Koryŏ's main troop strength, excepting the capital, was concentrated in two special military districts 兩界 in the northern border regions, with 142,372 soldiers in total—as compared to 52,241 in all the other provinces combined.⁴³

III. DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES, "SUBMITTED KHITANS," AND CULTURAL INFLUENCE

After several decades of military clashes and hostility, relations between Koryŏ and the Khitan were finally normalized in the early eleventh century. In 1020 Koryŏ freed a group of Khitan envoys it had detained for six years,⁴⁴ and the Khitan court invested Hyŏnjong as the "King of Koryŏ" in 1022, whereupon Koryŏ once again adopted the Khitan calendar.⁴⁵ Although the Khitan army made a few minor incursions across Koryŏ's northern border in 1033 and again in 1037,⁴⁶ there were no more major military clashes. After 1039, peaceful relations prevailed and the two states began to exchange regular embassies in the framework of the tribute system. These regular diplomatic contacts in turn stimulated economic exchanges and cultural interactions.

As the tribute system involved presentation of "tributes" as a symbolic expression of submission, Koryŏ was required to submit annual tributes consisting of its local products. Koryŏ's economy was basically agricultural and autarchic, so most of its tribute items appear to have fallen into the category of local specialties such as "precious swords," falcons, floor mats, medicines, hats, gauze, cloth, tea, paper, ink, and hemp clothes.⁴⁷ The actual value of Koryŏ's annual tributes appears to have been relatively small, and there is little evidence of any financial hardship caused by the burden of tribute, unlike during the period of Mongol interference in the fourteenth century or during the Chosŏn period. In fact, the Khitan often declined or

returned Koryŏ's tribute in the case of a death in the Koryŏ royal family,⁴⁸ whereas the huge Song annual payments 歲幣 were never canceled on the occasion of death in the Song imperial family.

In return for the tributes, the Khitan court bestowed “gifts” on Koryŏ's kings. Again, we have no comprehensive list of these gifts, but their value appears to have more than compensated for the tribute expenses. The Khitan gifts included court uniforms, silks, and horse riding equipment such as saddles. The *Qidan guozhi* 契丹國志 contains one list of the gifts to the Koryŏ king: two girdles decorated with rhinoceros horn and jade; two sets of fine garments; twenty-two horses, some with gold decorated saddles; two sets of bows, arrows, and other weapons; 200 bolts of silk; 100 bolts of lustring; 200 head of sheep; and some unknown amounts of wine and fruit. In addition, the members of the Koryŏ embassy were also given separate gifts: the chief envoy was given two belts decorated with silver and gold, two suits, 30 bolts of silk, 100 bolts of lustring, seven horses including two with saddles, a set of bow and arrows, other weapons, wine, and fruit; and lower-ranking officials received lesser amounts of the same items.⁴⁹

On the occasion of formal investiture of Koryŏ's kings, the Khitan court granted gifts of carriages or leather-decorated chariots, along with garments, saddles, bows, arrows, etc.⁵⁰ Two other regular embassies also brought gifts from the Khitan court: the Birthday Felicitation Embassy 生辰使 dispatched on the occasion of the birthday of Koryŏ's king probably brought personal gifts from the Khitan emperor; and the Imperial Gifts Embassies 橫宣[賜]使, sent once every three years, normally brought the king 2,000 head of sheep.⁵¹ Thus, Koryŏ appears to have come out very well in the economic exchanges conducted under the framework of the official tributary missions. Beside the exchanges of gifts and tributes through official embassies, there were other trades conducted in the capital cities and regulated by the state.⁵² The Koryŏ state agency named the “Office for Trade with the State of Liao” 遼國買賣院 oversaw trade with the Khitan and maintained two lodges for Khitan merchants.⁵³

The Khitan also pressured its southern neighbor to establish border markets 榷場,⁵⁴ but Koryŏ was concerned about the security of the border region and resisted all such initiatives. Of course, the Koryŏ court's policy could not eliminate the considerable illicit commercial trade at the border. It was said that when, in 1093, a court official suggested placing spies on the border, many looked forward to their tour of duty because it would give them opportunities to trade with the Khitans.⁵⁵ These economic exchanges were probably accompanied by some cultural interactions as well.

Other than regular diplomatic contacts and illicit trade, another channel for Khitan cultural transmission was the large number of refugees who began to flee the Liaodong region and settle in Koryŏ. In the eleventh century, Koryŏ welcomed a number of Khitan refugees who were escaping from chaotic conditions, military conscription, and exploitation.⁵⁶ The *Koryŏsa* recorded these refugees as “Khitans who submitted” 契丹投化人, and Han Kyuchŏl has suggested that most were probably descendants of Parhae people.⁵⁷ However, among them were probably a considerable number of Han Chinese and Khitan tribesmen who had been relocated to the Liaodong region by the Khitan court to replace the many Parhae people deported to other parts of the empire in the aftermath of the fall of Parhae in 926.⁵⁸

The court incorporated many of these Khitans into its regular military system and deployed them in the defense of the northern border,⁵⁹ but others were relocated to settlements in various parts of the kingdom. There are some hints that a considerable number of Khitans resided in Koryŏ. In the eighth month of 1117, while on a royal tour to the Southern Capital 南京 (modern Seoul), King Yejong 睿宗 was said to have been welcomed and entertained by “submitted Khitans”:

The king arrived at the Southern Capital. Khitans who had submitted had been scattered and settled in the Southern Capital and within the Suburbs. [They] played Khitan songs, dances, and shows to welcome the royal carriage. The king stopped and watched [the performances].

[王至南京, 契丹投化人, 散居南京圻內者, 奏契丹歌舞雜戲以迎駕, 王駐蹕觀之。]⁶⁰

In the following decade, Xu Jing 徐兢, a member of the Song embassy who stayed in the Koryŏ capital for one month in 1123, spoke of tens of thousands of “surrendered Khitans.” Xu wrote in his *Xuanhe fengshi Gaoli tujing* 宣和奉使高麗圖經,

[I] also heard that there are several tens of thousands of surrendered Khitans. One in ten was an artisan, and they selected those with exquisite skills and settled them at the capital. Nowadays utensils and clothing have become more elaborate, but they are rather ostentatious and fake. They cannot restore the simplicity of the years past.

[亦聞契丹降虜數萬人, 其工技十有一, 擇其精巧者, 留於王府。比年器服益工, 弟浮僞頗多, 不復前日純質耳。]⁶¹

A few scholars speculate that the actual number may even have been greater,⁶² and it would have been inevitable that the numerous Khitan refugees and

the native population would interact. What was the extent of Khitan cultural influence? In the fifth month of 1129, a few years after Xu Jing's reports and three years after the fall of the Khitan Empire, King Injong would issue the following edict lamenting the pervasiveness of "degenerate" Khitan influence:

Our Great Progenitor (T'aejo) had established our state. He was prudent, frugal, and simple. He envisioned a long-term plan to implement the ways of China and prohibit the custom of Khitan barbarians. [However,] today from the court at the top to the common people at the bottom, [all] compete to follow a fanciful style and imitate the customs of Khitan barbarians. That this has been going on and we have not returned to [our old ways] is indeed profoundly lamentable. Now, I wish to take the initiative to reform the degenerate customs [of the Khitans]. Things such as carriage and clothing, we shall discard the fanciful and revere the proper ways. You high-ranking officials should know my intentions and carry them out. [我太祖之開國也, 克慎儉德, 惟懷永圖, 景行華夏之法, 切禁丹狄之俗, 今則上自朝廷下至民庶, 競華靡之風, 襲丹狄之俗, 往而不返, 深可嘆也. 今朕庶幾率先以革末俗, 其乘輿服御之物, 皆去華尚質, 爾公卿大夫, 其體朕意, 奉而行之.]⁶³

How could the culture of the Khitans have appealed to the population of Koryŏ? The purely steppe-nomadic Khitan ways of the pre-dynastic period would not have been attractive, and were probably too alien for people in Koryŏ to be able to appreciate. The Khitan culture transmitted to Koryŏ was most likely a "third culture" which represented a fusion of original tribal steppe elements with the Han Chinese cultural tradition.⁶⁴ For example, the Khitan gifts of imperial carriages to the Koryŏ kings were probably constructed in the Han Chinese style with some Khitan cultural tastes and elements. It was recorded in the *Liaoshi* that the Khitan court entrusted high-ranking officials from China proper with the task of supervising the construction of the imperial carriages in 938.⁶⁵

The passage in the *Ten Injunctions* suggests that the greatest Khitan influence could be found in clothing and institutions, but there remains very little evidence to this effect. We may be able to gain a better sense of the Khitan influence through archaeological remains and relics such as celadon, metal works, and Buddhist scriptures and architecture. Buddhism greatly flourished as the state religion of both Khitan and Koryŏ, and it is more than likely that there were religious contacts and exchanges. The Khitan emperors considered themselves Bodhisattvas and *cakravartin*, and as devout followers and great patrons of Buddhism they actively propagated it throughout the empire.⁶⁶ While Khitan Buddhism was clearly based on the Han Chinese Buddhist tradition, by the mid-eleventh century the Khitans had developed

their own tradition, and even produced the *Tripitaka* in a form considered superior to the Song edition. The Khitan court sent a copy to Koryŏ, and Koryŏ's compilers of the *Tripitaka Koreana* utilized this Khitan edition along with the Northern Song edition to produce their own version. There are few historical sources and even fewer pieces of research on this important connection between Buddhism in Koryŏ and the Khitan; however, based on the extant material evidence, scholars have begun to draw connections between the two traditions. A recent study found that the Buddhist pagodas in Koryŏ of the eleventh and twelfth centuries show much greater similarities to the Khitan than the Song Chinese styles.⁶⁷

Other studies in the past few years have emphasized the Khitan cultural influence during the early Koryŏ period. While it is well known that the development of celadon in Koryŏ was greatly influenced by South China, new research has also shown an unmistakable Khitan influence in the eleventh century in areas such as inlaying techniques, production types, patterns, and motifs.⁶⁸ An Kwisuk also asserts that the exceptional quality of eleventh- and twelfth-century metal works such as the *kundika* (water sprinkler), bronze mirrors, swords, and stirrups, was due in part to the Khitan influence, which came through the excellent examples represented by the imperial gifts from the Khitan court as well as the Khitan artisans who settled in Koryŏ.⁶⁹ As the Khitan imperial gifts of clothing and silverwork were produced by the finest artisans employed by the Khitan court, artisans in Koryŏ would adopt their techniques, motifs, and designs. More scholarly attention and studies utilizing archaeological excavations will surely improve our understanding of the Khitan cultural elements in Koryŏ.

IV. CONCLUSION

The generally peaceful and relatively amicable Koryŏ–Song relations were not rooted in any “cultural affinity” between the two states. Koryŏ's admiration of and desire for Song cultural items may have been strong, but the security of its northern border with the Khitan always took precedence over cultural and economic benefits derived from relations with its neighbor across the Yellow Sea. Koryŏ was careful not to invite unnecessary confrontation with the Khitan and its diplomatic contact with the Song remained a secondary issue. For decades Koryŏ did not even maintain official relations with the Song, and what relations there were mostly took place outside the boundaries of the tribute system.

With respect to Koryŏ–Khitan relations, many years of political hostility and military conflicts certainly did not help to facilitate cultural interactions, but at the same time did not entirely prevent transmission of Khitan cultural elements into Koryŏ. The current lack of awareness of the Khitan (and Jurchen) influence may partly be due to the paucity of early Koryŏ historical sources and the strong Confucian bias against the northern “barbarians” apparent in the compilation of documents from Koryŏ in the early Chosŏn period. That there has been almost total lack of academic interest until very recently has also contributed to the erroneous notion that Khitan cultural influence in Koryŏ was negligible. Fortunately, new studies based on archaeological relics of material culture such as porcelain and metal works suggest new possibilities for this important aspect of cross-cultural relations during the early Koryŏ period. There is little doubt that new archaeological findings in China and Korea and further research will bring to light dynamic cultural interactions between Koryŏ and the Khitan.

NOTES

¹ Peter H. Lee, ed., *Sourcebook of Korean Civilization*, vol. 1: *From Early Times to the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 264; Chŏng Inji et al., eds., *Koryŏsa*, 3 vols. (Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 1972), 2:15b4–7.

² Imanishi Ryū, “Kōrai Taiso Kunyō jūō ni tsuite,” *Tōyō gaku* 8 (1918), reprinted in *Kōrai oyobi Ri-chō shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kokushū kankōkai, 1970), 45–61; Remco E. Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society in Medieval Korea, 918–1170: History, Ideology, and Identity in the Koryŏ Dynasty* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 351–406.

³ Although many historians use “the Khitan” as the name of the people and “the Liao” as the name of the state, the Khitan people themselves always used “the Khitan” as the name of their state. Thus the terms “the Khitan state” or “the Khitan Empire,” towards which English usage would tend to push us, in fact build in a redundancy. My usage in this paper reflects a desire to be faithful to the original sources. I use “the Khitans” to refer to the people, and “the Khitan” to refer to the state.

⁴ Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 167–77.

⁵ *Koryŏsa*, 1:16b2.

⁶ *Koryŏsa*, 2:14a9–b1.

⁷ Breuker, *Establishing a Pluralist Society*, 363.

⁸ Kim Sanggi, *Sin’p’yŏn Koryŏ sidaesa* (Seoul: Seoul taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1985), 33–34; Yi Yongbŏm, *Hanman kyoryusa yŏn’gu* (Seoul: Tonghwa ch’ulp’an kongsa, 1989), 209–28.

⁹ Yi Chehyŏn, *Yŏgong p’aesŏl*, in *Koryŏ myŏngnyŏnjip*, 5 vols. (Seoul: Sŏnggyun’gwan taehakkyo taedong munhwa yŏnguwŏn, 1980), chŏn 前, 1:5a8–6b1.

¹⁰ *Liaoshi* (Beijing: Zonghua shuju, 1974), 2.21–22.

¹¹ *Koryŏsa*, 1:14a8–b3, 16a8–9; Yi Kūnhwa, “Koryŏ T’aejodae pukpang chŏngch’aek ūi surip kwa kŭ sŏnggwa,” in *Pak Sŏngbong kyosu hoegap kinyŏm nonchŏng* (Seoul: Pak Sŏngbong kyosu hoegap

kinyŏm nonchŏng kanhaeng wiwŏnhoe, 1987), 155–76.

¹² *Liaoshi*, 17.203–4; Han Kyuchŏl, *Parhae ūi taecae kwangyesa* (Seoul: Sinsŏwŏn, 1994), 260–67.

¹³ *Koryŏsa*, 2:25b5–6.

¹⁴ *Koryŏsa*, 94:2b8.

¹⁵ *Koryŏsa*, 81:3b6–7; Yi Kibaek, *Koryŏ pyŏngjesa yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1968), 162–81.

¹⁶ *Liaoshi*, 10.112, 115; *Songshi* (Beijing: Zonghua shuju, 1974), 491.14128–29.

¹⁷ Han, *Parhae*, 241–60.

¹⁸ *Liaoshi*, 10.115; *Koryŏsa*, 3:9b1–2.

¹⁹ *Koryŏsa*, 92:10b2–5.

²⁰ *Koryŏsa*, 93:12a3–b2.

²¹ *Koryŏsa*, 3:8b9–9a2, 10a3.

²² The actual number may have been between 60,000 and 150,000; see An Chusŏp, *Koryŏ Kŏran Chŏnjaeng* (Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2003), 80.

²³ *Liaoshi*, 13:143; *Koryŏsa*, 94:2a4.

²⁴ *Koryŏsa*, 3:26a5–6.

²⁵ *Koryŏsa*, 94:4b1–3.

²⁶ *Koryŏsa*, 3:26b4–27a6, 94:4b4–5a2.

²⁷ *Koryŏsa*, 3:27b9–28a1, 94:5b4–7.

²⁸ *Koryŏsa*, 3:27a6–7.

²⁹ *Koryŏsa*, 3:27b4–5.

³⁰ Denis Twitchett and Klaus-Peter Tietze, “The Liao,” in *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 6: Alien Regimes and Border States*, ed. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), 104.

³¹ Li Tao, *Xu zizhi tongjian changbian* (Beijing: Zonghua shuju, 1979–93), 74:1695.

³² *Koryŏsa*, 3:27b5–6.

³³ *Liaoshi*, 13:144–47; *Koryŏsa*, 3:28b6–7.

³⁴ *Liaoshi*, 88.1342.

³⁵ *Koryŏsa*, 3:28b7–8; *Liaoshi*, 13.147, 65.1002, 88.1342–43.

³⁶ *Koryŏsa*, 3:29b7–8; *Liaoshi*, 13.150, 115.1520.

³⁷ *Koryŏsa*, 5:12b9–13a1.

³⁸ *Songshi*, 487:14045.

³⁹ Wang Gungwu, “The Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire: Early Sung Relations with Its Neighbors,” in *China among Equals*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 53.

⁴⁰ *Koryŏsa*, 93:16b2.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Kim Chongsŏ et al., eds., *Koryŏsa chŏryo* (Seoul: Asea Munhwasa, 1972), 4:5a2–7.

⁴³ Yi Kibaek, *Koryŏ pyŏngjesa*, 205, 253.

⁴⁴ *Koryŏsa*, 4:32b8–33a1; *Liaoshi*, 16:187.

⁴⁵ *Koryŏsa*, 4:38a1–4.

⁴⁶ *Koryŏsa*, 5:29a3–4, 6:12b5–6.

⁴⁷ *Liaoshi*, 1.10, 14.163, 70.1142–43, 1150, 115.1520; *Koryŏsa*, 6:14b6–7, 16:6b5.

⁴⁸ Peter I. Yun, “Rethinking the Tribute System: Korean States and Northeast Asian Interstate Relations, 600–1600” (PhD diss., University of California, 1998), 125–26.

⁴⁹ Ye Rongli, ed., *Qidan guozhi* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1985), 21:3a–b.

⁵⁰ *Koryŏsa*, 12:6b8–7a1, 12:33b7–8, 72:14b4–9.

⁵¹ Pak Hannam, “Koryŏ chŏngi ‘Hoengsŏnsa’ sogo,” *Puchŏn Sin Yŏnchŏl kyosu chŏngnyon tŏeim kinyŏm sahak nonchŏng* (Seoul: Irwŏl sŏgak, 1995), 501–24.

⁵² Yi Yongbŏm, *Hanman kyoryusa yŏn'gu*, 229–62.

⁵³ *Chŏngbo munhŏn pigo*, 164:1b4–5, 10.

- ⁵⁴ *Koryŏsa*, 10:8b8–9; Yi Miji, “Koryŏ Sŏnjongdae kakchang munje wa dae Yo kwan’gye,” *Han’guksa hakpo* 14 (2003): 84–100.
- ⁵⁵ *Chŭngbo munhŏn pigo*, 122:12a3–5.
- ⁵⁶ *Liaoshi*, 103.1446; Karl Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, *The History of Chinese Society: Liao (907–1125)* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1949), 408–9.
- ⁵⁷ Han, *Parhae*, 278–81.
- ⁵⁸ Wittfogel and Feng, *History*, 54.
- ⁵⁹ *Koryŏsa*, 9:9a8–b1.
- ⁶⁰ *Koryŏsa*, 14:23b9–24a2.
- ⁶¹ Xu Jing, *Xuanhe fengshi Gaoli tujing* (Taipei: Guoli gugong bowuyuan, 1974), 19:2b2–4.
- ⁶² Pak Okkŏl, *Koryŏ sidae ūi kwihwain yŏng’gu* (Seoul: Kukhak charyowŏn, 1996), 41–57.
- ⁶³ *Koryŏsa*, 16:3a2–8.
- ⁶⁴ Wittfogel and Feng, *History*, 20.
- ⁶⁵ *Liaoshi*, 55.901.
- ⁶⁶ Wittfogel and Feng, *History*, 291–309.
- ⁶⁷ Kang Pyŏnghŭi, “Koryŏ chŏng’gi sahoe pyŏndong kwa pul’ap: 11–12 segi pul’ap ūi pukpangjŏk yŏng’hyang,” *Misul sahak* 23 (2009): 287–88, 306.
- ⁶⁸ Chang Namwŏn, “10–12 segi Koryŏ wa Yo Kŭm doja ūi kyoryu,” *Misul sahak* 23 (2009): 171–203.
- ⁶⁹ An Kwisuk, “Koryŏ kŭmsok kongye e poinŭn Yo munhwa ūi yŏng’hyang,” *Ihwa sahak yŏng’gu* 40 (2010): 119–20.

